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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review orders of the Industrial 
Commission (now the Utah Labor Commission) pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-86 (1996) (repealed effective July 1, 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-303(6) 
(1997)).1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Appeals Board erred in disregarding and reversing the 
Administrative Law Judge by taking the evidence and making its own credibility 
determinations. This issue involves the application of law to undisputed facts, 
which is reviewed under correction of error standard, Drake v. Industrial 
Commission, 939 P.2d 1 77 (Utah 1997). 
2. Whether the Labor Commission erred in holding Red Cliffs Regional, 
Inc., liable for temporary partial impairment compensation, when the applicant was 
returned to light duty work, but failed to return to work. This issue involves the 
application of law to undisputed facts, which is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
'The entire Utah Workers' Compensation Act was repealed and recodified effective July 1,1997, 
and the Industrial Commission was replaced by the Labor Commission. This brief refers primarily 
to the Act as it was in effect on January 18, 1997, the date of the applicant's claimed injury. In 
addition, the brief refers to the "Industrial Commission," or simply the "Commission." 
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3. Whether the Labor Commission erred in failing to grant a hearing to 
the defendant as to the issues of temporary disability payments where the 
Administrative Law Judge had previously found that there was no industrial 
accident. The Court of Appeals reviews the Commission's failure to grant a hearing 
under a correction of error standard. Crapo v. Industrial Commission, 922 P.2d 39 
(UtahCt. App. 1996). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. S34A-1-303. 
(1) A decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title is the 
final order of the commission unless a further appeal is initiated under this title and 
in accordance with the rules of the commission governing the review. 
(2) (a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who is entitled to 
appeal a decision of an administrative law judge under this title, may 
appeal the decision by filing a motion for review with the Division of 
Adjudication. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests in 
accordance with Subsection (3) that the appeal be heard by the 
Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. A decision 
of the commissioner is a final order of the commission unless set aside 
by the court of appeals. 
(c) (i) If in accordance with Subsection (3) a party in 
interest to the appeal requests that the appeal be heard by 
the Appeals Board, the Appeals Board shall hear the 
review in accordance with: 
(A) Section 34A-1-205; and 
(B) Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(ii) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the 
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If 
(3) A party ii i ii iterest may request that an appeal be heard b> the Appeals 
Board by filing the request with the Divisioi i of .Adjudication: 
(a) as part of the motion for review; or 
(b) if requested by a party in interest who uiu nu: \ a moiiori for 
review, within 20 days of the date the nrr* : '^ ; • ''P\v \* filed with 
(4) (a) On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(rA modifv th^ decision of an administrative ,Qw jurlqp-
( I I I ; 11" r ( ' " u i ^ r i u , • r 
f l j r t ^« ' • * K r l i r f >.' *-
(i\ ) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an 
administrative law ji i :lge, 
(b) The commissioner or Appeals Board ma} ' not conduct a trial 
di: novo of the case. 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(i i) o n w i i tte n a rg u m e n t o r w i i tte n supplemental evidence 
requested by the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
( d I 1 I I I I l l II (III III III III III II Il i | ) | K M l" i I I i I I I II I I II II II II | I II II III II II II III III I I III \iVK ( l I I 
(i) file briefs ot other p 4pers; or 
(ii) conduct oral argument. 
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(e) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the 
parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, including its 
findings and conclusions. 
(5) (a) A member of the Appeals Board may not participate in any 
case in which the member is an interested party. Each decision of a 
member of the Appeals Board shall represent the member's 
independent judgment. 
(b) If a member of the Appeals Board may not participate in a 
case because the member is an interested party, the two members of 
the Appeals Board that may hear the case shall assign an individual to 
participate as a member of the board in that case if the individual: 
(i) is not a interested party in the case; and 
(ii) was not previously assigned to preside over any 
proceeding or take any administrative action related to the 
case. 
(6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the party appealing the 
order has exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of appeals has jurisdiction 
to: 
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or 
Appeals Board; or 
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board being appealed. 
Utah Code Ann.5 34A-2-410(2) 
(1) (a) In case of temporary disability, so long as the disability is total, the 
employee shall receive 66 2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury but: 
(2) In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee 
reaching a fixed state of recovery, and when no light duty employment is available 
-4-
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be pa1'1 
^ w / i Code Ann.5 34A-2-411 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee 
shall receive weekly compensation equal to; 
id) 66 2/3% of tl le diffei ence between i:u * ,.,Mioye-.'.- average 
weekly wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee 
is able to earn after the accident; but not more thai i 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of ii ijui > ; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for earh dependent child 
iinder the age o1 ]k * '- T ;O a maximum ot to..: such dependent 
children, but only up to a total weekly compensation that does not 
exceed 100°/ ^ t h r -,tate s cwv v \ ^ f 4 ^ *\aue <v * ; ^ ( -*" ; ' 
l „ i j iL-uj i i , . : i : \s iui .Mid> urut i dii ctward toi temp <:i\ partial disability foi 
work at any time prior to eight years after the date of the .. ijur> to an employee: 
(a) whose physical concPf^e - ".ui — ig from the injury is not 
finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of ir i jui y; ar id 
(\ , . ^ n 
34 V J 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor 
continue more than eight years after the date of the injui ) Payments shall terminate 
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
Utai \ Code Aim s uj-^ub-oyUj. 
(1) Except as pr ovided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), ii i all formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as fol lows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the c ejrse of the hearing to 
-5-
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasona 
opportunity to present their positions. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity 
to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and 
submit rebuttal evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1997). 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(g) The agency action is based on a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
E 
• . Introduction 
This is a Petition for Review of an Order by the I 'tah Labor Commission 
are liable to pay workers' compensation benefits to Respondent Clenda Chambers 
for back problems as a result of an alleged i r ; ^he appeals board overturned the 
ad m i n i strat i * e I a * * j i i d ge s c i eel i lb i I i t} ell sh 
b ,.. ... Usabilities payments from the time of the mju; 7 until August of 1997. 
However KU Chambers began working full t ime for another employer immediately 
after the alleged mju •- • 
h K! ;-. : stabilize * un m /v\aicli u\ 1997, theieby cutting off any temporary 
payments that Ms. Chambers should have been awarded, 
I I . Procedura nry 
Rp<;nr.nrlrnt' !r>ndd ^hdi iibei s (the "applicant") ii istituted these proceedings 
before the Labor Commission of Utal •?= \me 7. 10Q"" when she filed an 
Applicatioi i . .. ^inasef- ^ .\v„!v.. p * 
Red Cliff Regional, Inc., anu ib insurer, Business Insurance Company (referred to 
collectively as "Red Cliff"' for injuries she allegedly su^tr.ined on hnuarv 1 ° i n n 7 
(III <! 5). I le ::) C II i 1 f c l e i i i ee l II i; : n : • i mi 1 r y • ; : i i til i• E I g i n ::>i 11 i• ::l s till i j s 
substantially lacking and because of \ ler ability to work oi \ a light-duty , modified 
basi- 'R. 33-36). The applicant received a light duty release approximately three 
7 
weeks after the alleged incident, yet failed to report for light duty work. (R. 140). In 
addition to receiving the light duty work release, the applicant began working full-
time for another employer immediately after the incident. 
The matter went to a hearing in front of the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge, on February 26, 1998. (R. 330; Hearing transcript). After 
the hearing, Judge Sims issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that the applicant was injured in 
an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment for Red Cliffs as 
required by the Workers' Compensation Act. (R.236-242; Findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order, attached hereto as Exhibit 1). The administrative law 
judge found that the applicant lacked credibility, and therefore, found that there was 
no industrial accident (R. 240, paragraph 18). 
Applicant Glenda Chambers filed a Request for Review with the Industrial 
Commission on June 26, 1998. (R. 243-247). The administrative law judge sent the 
case to the Commissioner on a motion for review filed by the applicant. (R. 259-
260). Therefore, the Commissioner, not the Appeals Board should have had 
jurisdiction over the review. However, the Appeals Board, on September 1, 1998 
entered a new Order, granting the Request for Review, specifically overturning the 
credibility determination of the administrative law judge, and remanded the case. 
(R. 261-263; Order of Remand attached hereto as Exhibit 2). The Appeals Board 
overturned the administrative law judge's credibility determination, and found that 
-8-
the applicant suffered a work-related accident. Upon remand, citing the 
requirement to believe the applicant's story form the Appeals Board, (R. 274), the 
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant was entitled to temporary partial 
disability without granting Red Cliffs a hearing on the issues of the applicant's 
medical condition. (R. 274-278; Findings of Fact, Conclusion of law and Order on 
Remand, attached hereto as Exhibit 3). On September 15, 1998, Red Cliff filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration with the Appeals Board, which was not ruled upon 
because the Appeals Board felt there was no final order. (R. 265-273). 
Red Cliffs then filed a Request for Reconsideration or in the alternative 
Motion for Review with the Appeals Board. (R. 282-296). The Appeals Board 
issued an Order denying Red Cliffs Request for Reconsideration on January 14, 
1999. (R. 307-312). Red Cliff filed a Petition for Review on February 11, 1999, and 
a Docketing Statement on March 4, 1999. 
III. Uncontested Facts 
Respondent, Glenda Chambers, alleges that she was injured on January 18, 
1997, at Red Cliffs Regional while assisting a patient into her wheelchair. (R. 5). 
The accident was unwitnessed, unverified, and not properly reported. At the time 
of the alleged injury, Ms. Chambers was working two part-time jobs, one for Red 
Cliffs and a second job for Washington County ARC. The applicant began working 
for Red Cliffs in November of 1996, part-time as a nurses assistant. (R. 330, page 12 
line 4, page 13 line 1). The applicant was earning $6.15 per hour while working for 
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Red Cliffs. (R. 5). Ms. Chambers worked an average of approximately 20 hours per 
week during the time she was employed by Red Cliffs. (R.1 77-182). For the two 
week pay period, just prior to the accident, January 1st through the 15th, the 
applicant worked a total of 39 hours (an average of 19.5 hours per week). (R. 330, 
page 46 lines 15-18). 
As stated above, Ms. Chambers was also working a second job with 
Washington ARC. Ms Chambers was working 18-20 hours per week at Washington 
ARC, earning $6.25 per hour, prior to the alleged accident. (R. 330, page 16 lines 
5-1 7). After the alleged accident, Ms. Chambers began working full-time for 
Washington ARC. (R. 330, page 79 lines 5-14; R. 240). In fact, Ms. Chambers went 
to work at Washington ARC the day after the alleged accident, and worked six of 
the next seven days. (R. 330, page 51 line 1 7, page 52 line 24). 
Ms. Chambers reported that her duties and responsibilities at Washington 
ARC were similar to those at Red Cliffs except there was not any lifting involved at 
Washington ARC. (R. 330, page 32 lines 21-23). She testified that there was not 
any lifting whatsoever at Washington ARC, however, she later testified that some 
time in March, she allegedly re-injured her back while lifting a patient. (R. 330, 
page 34 Iines7-18). 
On February 26, 1998, the Administrative Law Judge found that the 
testimony of Ms. Chambers was inconsistent and that she contradicted herself on 
material and relevant bits of information essential to the resolution of her case. The 
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Administrative Law Judge went on to find that the totality of the evidence was 
insufficient to show the circumstances which were alleged by Ms. Chambers since 
her testimony was less than credible and every bit of evidence which can be 
mustered to show that she was injured must rely on her statement that she in fact 
was injured. (R. 236-242). 
The applicant initially reported that she injured her back while assisting a 
patient into her wheelchair, and the patient alleged fell on top of her. (R. 5). The 
applicant reported that she felt pain in her back at that time, but did not report the 
incident to anyone, because she was afraid she would be fired. (R. 330 page 25, 
lines 1-15). She stated that two days earlier, Red Cliffs threatened to fire her. (R. 
330 page 25, lines 14-15). Upon cross-examination, Ms Chambers testified that she 
failed to report or call in, and therefore Red Cliff did fired her, but then after she 
came in and talked to someone, they gave her a second chance, putting her on 
some type of probation. (R. 330, page 45 line 12, page 46 line 25). 
After the accident, Ms. Chambers was able to lift the patient off the ground 
into the wheelchair and take her down to the lunchroom. (R. 330 page 26). This is 
somewhat astonishing as Ms. Chamber's reported the patient was a rather large 
women, had no mobility whatsoever and was nothing more than dead weight. (R. 
330, page 23 lines 1-9). After going down to the lunchroom, Ms. Chambers came 
in contact with another employee, but did not say anything about the accident to 
her. (R. 330, page 26 line 21, page 27 line 7). Later that evening, after her shift 
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ended, Ms. Chambers went to the emergency room to seek treatment. (R. 330, 
page 27). Ms. Chambers then testified that she reported the incident to Val Penman 
of Red Cliff, and testified that he informed her to bring in a report within three days. 
(R. 330, page 28, lines 14-25). However, Val Penman testified that he did not have 
any type of discussion with Ms. Chambers regarding her work-related accident. (R. 
330, page 103 lines 15-20). Finally, the applicant was released for modified duty 
work on January 20, 1997, but she never reported to Red Cliffs Regional, Inc., for 
any sort of light duty work, even though she was working full time for another 
employer. (R. 330, page 57). 
The medical records indicate that Ms. Chambers did not seek any treatment 
for her back in May, June or July, nor did she miss any work during those months. 
(R. 330, page 81). Ms. Chambers testified that she was forced to terminate 
treatment on her back because she didn't have money to pay the bills. (R. 330, 
page 38 lines 13-15). However, on cross-examination, Ms Chambers testimony 
changed as she testified that she did not terminate treatment on her back because of 
money. (R. 330, page 74 lines 10-21). In fact, it was reported that the applicant 
had reached stabilization as there was nothing more that the doctors could do for 
her. (R. 330, page 74 line 22, page 75 line 19). Further evidence that Ms. 
Chambers had reached medical stabilization prior to August, the time in which 
temporary disability payments were discontinued, is the lack of treatment sought by 
the Ms. Chambers. 
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In August, the applicant voluntarily quit her job at Washington ARC and 
moved to California. After moving to California, the applicant filed for 
unemployment compensation, and in doing so stated that she was ready, willing, 
and able to work. (R. 330, page 80). Temporary disability payments were cutoff at 
that time. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The function of the administrative law judge in the workers' compensation 
setting is akin to the function of the fact-finder in the civil arena. Therefore, the 
administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should 
generally be binding on the reviewing court. The administrative law judge, not the 
Appeals Board is in the best position to make a credibility determination, and such 
determination should only be overturned if it is clearly erroneous. In this case, 
there was substantial evidence to support the Findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge, and therefore, they should have been upheld. 
Where the administrative law judge previously found that there was no 
industrial accident, and then upon remand (without an additional hearing), found 
that Red Cliffs was responsible for temporary disability payments, Red Cliffs was 
denied its guaranteed rights of due process. 
Because the applicant was able to perform light duty work, and refused to 
perform light duty work at Red Cliffs, but instead chose to start working full-time at 
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Washington ARC immediately after the alleged accident, Red Cliffs should not be 
required to pay any temporary disability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IS IN A SUPERIOR POSITION TO 
EVALUATE AND WEIGH THE EVIDENCE AND ASSESS WITNESS 
CREDIBILITY. 
It is generally held that the trier of fact or the hearer of evidence is in the best 
position to ascertain credibility of witnesses. Deference should be given to the 
initial decision maker on questions of fact because it stands in a superior position 
from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and 
accuracy of witnesses. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
Although credibility itself is not a factual issue that is appropriately the subject of 
findings of fact, the findings of the ultimate facts implicitly reflect consideration of 
the believability of the witness's testimony. See, Adoption of Mclnstrav v. 
Mclnstrav, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1981). 
"Normally, a proper credibility evaluation requires that the fact finder hear 
and observe the witness. Credibility is not readily discernible by one who merely 
reads a cold record/7 Adams v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 710 P.2d 1073, 
1075 (Ariz. App. 1985) (quoting Pigrenet v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 
1190, 1191 (5th Cir. 1980)). The function of the administrative law judge in the 
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workers' compensation setting is akin to the function of the fact-finder in the civil 
arena. Adams v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 710 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Ariz. App. 
1985). "Appellate courts have therefore consistently espoused the rule that the 
administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally 
binding on the reviewing court." jcL The purpose of this rule is that the fact finder 
is in the best position to consider the voice tone, hesitation or readiness with 
answers, his eyes, pitch or uncertainty of the witness's voice, gestures, expressions, 
and other non verbal communication, hd. 
In City of Wauwatosa v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 328 N.W2d 882 
(Wis. App. 1982), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was presented with an issue 
much like the one we are now faced with. The court held that since the examiner's 
decision was based on the credibility of the witnesses, the Commission could not 
overturn that decision without first consulting with the examiner on the credibility 
issue and clearly stating in the record its reasons for disagreeing with the examiner's 
conclusion. The court went on to hold that it was a denial of due process for the 
Commission to make its own findings under the circumstances where credibility is 
at issue. kL 
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A. The Administrative Law ludge, not the Appeals Board is in the best 
position to make a credibility determination. 
In this particular case, only the administrative law judge could observe the 
countenance and candor of the Applicant as she attempted to testify. What the 
administrative law judge observed, could not be reviewed or observed by the 
Appeals Board by reviewing a written record. The applicant's voice tone, facial 
expression, body language, skin tones, fidgety movements, the confidence in her 
answers, lack of eye contact, all affect the credibility determination made by the 
administrative law judge. These are all items that cannot be reviewed by the 
Appeals Board, and historically are items that have not been the subject of an 
appeal. The administrative law judge who takes the actual evidence and reviews 
the testimony is in the best position to feel what is being presented and to get a 
sense of the applicant's credibility. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 1 77 
(Utah 1997). 
The Appeals Board, not the Labor Commission reviewed the decision of the 
administrative law judge, and as such must only perform reviews as allowed by 
statute. They cannot take evidence and therefore "it is not for this court to 
determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses," Birrell v. 
Ind. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987), but must review the evidence to see if 
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the evidence supports the findings of the administrative law judge. The 
administrative law judge found, 
"the testimony of the petitioner is inconsistent and she contradicted 
herself on material and relevant bits of information essential to a 
resolution of this case. Her testimony when compared to the testimony 
of others, and when viewed in connection with medical documents is 
also deficient. The petitioner testified the patient fell on her in an 
unwitnessed accident on January 18, 1997. However, the totality of 
the evidence is insufficient to show the circumstances which she 
alleges since her testimony is less than credible, and every bit of 
evidence in this case which can be mustered to show that she was 
injured must rely on her own statement that she in fact was injured. 
There is no independent evidence not relying on her statement to 
show that the incident did occur. If she had been more credible in 
other instances in this case, the evidence might have been sufficient to 
a preponderance to confirm her claim/' (See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, paragraph 18, attached hereto as 
Addendum No. 1). 
After the administrative law judge found that the evidence did not establish 
that the applicant suffered an industrial accident, which was based upon a 
credibility determination, the applicant filed a Request for Review.2 The Appeals 
Board incorrectly reversed the credibility determination made by the administrative 
law judge and found that the applicant's "failure to immediately report the accident 
to Red Cliffs' staff tends to undermine her credibility. Nevertheless, the Appeals 
Board concludes that the preponderance of evidence establishes that on January 18, 
2
 The Administrative Law Judge sent the case to the Commissioner. (R. 259-260). 
Therefore, the Commissioner, not the Appeals Board should have had jurisdiction to 
review the administrative law judge's denial of her claim for benefits under the 
Worker's Compensation Act. 
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1997, Ms. Chambers was involved in the accident while working at Red Cliffs." 
(See, R. 261-263; Order of Remand, page 2, attached hereto as Exhibit 2). 
The Appeals Board's responsibility was not to be a finder of fact, but rather 
perform a review of the findings of the ALJ. The ALJ's findings are to be affirmed as 
long as the evidence supports those findings. See Birrell v. Ind. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 
1331 (Utah 1987). The fact that the applicant failed to immediately report the 
accident is only one fact that was considered by the administrative law judge in its 
credibility determination, and the Appeals Board reversal of the administrative law 
judge's credibility determination on this fact alone was clearly erroneous. There 
were also other issues that were analyzed by the administrative law judge in 
making its credibility determination. As stated in the statements of fact above, the 
applicant began working full-time for another employer the day after the alleged 
accident. It is also reported by the applicant that she was unable to pursue 
treatments for her alleged back injury because Red Cliff denied compensation 
benefits. (R. 330, page 38 lines 13-15). However, upon cross examination, the 
applicant testified that treatments were not stopped due to a lack of money as she 
had earlier testified. (R. 330, page 74 lines 10-21). Next, the applicant reported 
that she reported her injury to Val Penman, an employee at Red Cliffs (R. 330, page 
28 lines 14-23)., however, he did not remember every talking to the applicant about 
a work injury. (R. 330, page 103 lines 15-20). He testified that if she would have 
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notified him, he would have filled out an incident report since which was the 
standard procedure. 
B. Findings of Fact should not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Application of the clearly erroneous 
standards set forth in Rule 52(a), does not eliminate the deference traditionally 
accorded the fact finder to determine the credibility of witnesses. Henderson v. For-
Shor, 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous 
only if it can be shown that they are against the clear weight of evidence or that 
they induced a definite and firm condition that a mistake has been made. Butler v. 
Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Appeals Board failed to show or find that the ALTs findings were clearly 
wrong. See Moreno v. NULCO Mfg. Corp., 591 A.2d 788 (R.I. 1988) (The Supreme 
Court reversed the Commission's finding, stating that the Commission may not set 
aside findings based on credibility determinations unless it first finds that the ALTs 
findings are clearly wrong or that the trial commissioner misconceived or 
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overlooked material evidence). Similarly, the findings of fact will not be set aside 
on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Henderson v. For. Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 
(UtahCt. App. 1988). 
In Rubalcava v. Worker's Comp. App. BcL 220 Cal. App. 3d 901, 269 Cal. 
Rptr. 656 (1990), the court noted that the Board may resolve conflicts in the 
evidence, make its own credibility determination, and reject findings of the Workers 
Compensation Judge and enter its own findings. However, the court stressed that 
when the Workers' Compensation Judge's findings are supported by credible 
evidence, they are to be given great weight and rejected only on the basis of 
contrary evidence of considerable substantiality. Furthermore, the WCJ's findings 
on the credibility of witnesses should be given great weight because the WCJ is in 
the best position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and weigh their 
statements in connection to their behavior on the stand. kL As such, the court in 
Rubalcava, found that the WCJ's findings should be reinstated. 
It is clear from the evidence that the Appeals Board reversal of the 
administrative law judge's credibility determination based solely on the fact that the 
applicant may or may not have immediately reported the accident is contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. As stated above, there were numerous other factors which 
the administrative law judge based his credibility determination on besides the fact 
that the applicant did not immediately report her injury. The administrative law 
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judge, not the Appeals Board is in the best position to make a credibility 
determination, and such determination should only be overturned if it is clearly 
erroneous. In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge, and therefore, they should have been upheld. 
II THE LABOR COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A HEARING 
TO THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE ISSUES OF TEMPORARY DISABILITY 
PAYMENTS, WHERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAD 
PREVIOUSLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
It has been held that "every person who brings a claim in a court or at a 
hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive a 
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal/' Bunnell v. Ind. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(Utah 1987). All parties shall have the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination and submit rebuttal evidence. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46B-8(d). The administrative law judge initially found that because of the 
applicant's lack of credibility, there was no industrial accident. Therefore, there was 
no need for Red Cliff to present any evidence regarding the applicant's claim for 
temporary disability payments. However, the Appeals Board reversed the decision 
of the administrative law judge and remanded the case for a determination of both 
legal and medical causation. On remand, the administrative law judge found that 
the applicant was entitled to temporary partial disability payments through August 
25, 1997. (R. 274-278). This was done without giving Red Cliff the opportunity for 
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a hearing that would have allowed them to present evidence that refuted the 
applicant's claim for temporary disability payments, which at a minimum, would 
have established that she had reached medical stabilization in March 1997. Any 
temporary disability payments should have ceased in March of 1997, as the medical 
records clearly established that the applicant had reached stabilization. 
It has been held that the constitutional rights of due process, which every 
citizen of this state is entitled to, apply in an agency proceeding. "Due process is 
flexible and calls for the procedural protections that a given situation demands." in 
re Wirthin, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996). Notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
elementary requirements of due process of law when the rights of a party are to be 
effected by judicial proceedings, and, as an industrial commission exercises quasi 
judicial functions, parties should be given an opportunity to be heard. Denver & 
R.G.W.R.R. v. Ind.Comm'n. 279 P. 612 (Utah 1929). Where the administrative 
law judge previously found that there was no industrial accident, and then upon 
remand (without an additional hearing), found that Red Cliffs was responsible for 
temporary disability payments, Red Cliffs was denied its guaranteed rights of due 
process. 
An employer has a right and opportunity to present his or her side of the 
story and to present evidence regarding the applicant's medical condition. This is 
not a matter of legislative grace, but rather a constitutional guarantee. See, Lucas v. 
.11. 
Murray City Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As part of the 
due process rights, this court held that "all parties to an agency hearing must be 
given opportunity to cross examine witnesses, inspect documents and to offer 
evidence in explanation or rebuttal." Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control 964 P.2d 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing, D.B. v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Red Cliffs should have been granted a hearing to present evidence as to the 
applicant's condition and possible entitlement to temporary disability payments. 
Because the administrative law judge initially found that there was no industrial 
accident, there was no need for Red Cliffs to present evidence as to the applicant's 
medical condition, or evidence which would have established that the applicant 
had reached medical stabilization, thereby cutting off liability. Upon remand by the 
Appeals Board, the administrative law judge should have granted Red Cliffs a 
hearing, which would have provided them an opportunity to present evidence 
regarding the applicant's temporary disability and medical condition. 
Ill THE COMMISSION ERRED BY AWARDING TEMPORARY PARTIAL 
DISABILITY WHEN THE APPLICANT WAS RELEASED TO LIGHT DUTY 
WORK, BUT FAILED TO REPORT WHEN RED CLIFFS OFFERED SUCH 
WORK 
When a claimant reaches medical stabilization, he is no longer eligible for 
temporary benefits. Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 754 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1988). Temporary disability benefits are to be discontinued as soon as the point of 
medical stabilization is reached. Reddish v. Sentinel Consumer Prods., 771 P.2d 
1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Likewise, temporary disability ceases when the 
claimant returns to work initially following accident. Sanderson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 400 P.2d 756 (Utah 1965). In addition, Temporary disability payments 
"are intended to compensate a [worker] during the period of healing and until he is 
able to return to work. . ." Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 61 7, 
619-20 (Utah 1977); Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 11 76 (Utah 
1985). 
The applicant was clearly able to return to work as she went to full-time status 
the very next day at her other job. The record is clear that the Ms. Chambers was 
able to perform light duty work as she continue working for Washington ARC, and 
went to work the very next day. Another important factor is the fact that Ms. 
Chambers went from a part-time employee working approximately 18-20 hours per 
week to basically a full time employee immediately after the accident. (R. 330, 
page 46 lines 15-18; R. 57). It is clear from the medical records that Ms. Chambers 
was able to perform light duty work, as she began working full time for another 
employer immediately after her alleged injury. Furthermore, that applicant did not 
seek any treatment for her back after April of 1997. (R. 330, page 81). Finally, it 
was reported to the applicant that there was nothing more that could be done, 
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indicating that the applicant had reached stabilization, therefore therapy for her 
back was discontinued. (R. 330, page 74). 
In this case, Ms. Chambers was awarded temporary partial disability.3 
However, Ms. Chambers did not have a disability that prevented her from working, 
and there is no indication in the medical records that the applicant had not healed 
from the alleged accident. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-410(2) provides that "[l]n the 
event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a fixed 
state of recovery, and when no light duty employment is available to the employee 
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid/' id. In 
interpreting this statute, it is clear that if the applicant has obtained a light duty 
medical release, and refuses to accept light duty work, temporary disability should 
be cutoff. The applicant was released to light duty work on January 20, 1997. 
Further evidence that the applicant was able to perform light duty work was the fact 
that the applicant went to work the next day for Washington ARC, and began 
working full time. (R. 330, page 51 line 1 7, page 52 line 24; R. 330, page 79 lines 
5-14). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-411 provides that "If the injury causes temporary partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation equal to. . .(2) The commission may order 
an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior to eight years after the date of 
the injury to an employee (a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed 
and fixed eight years after the date of injury. . . Payments shall terminate when the disability ends 
or the injured employee dies." There is no indication that Ms Chambers had a disability that 
prevented her from working. 
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Because the applicant was able to perform light duty work, and refused to 
perform light duty work at Red Cliffs, but instead chose to start working full-time at 
Washington ARC immediately after the alleged accident, Red Cliffs should not be 
required to pay any temporary disability. Temporary disability payments are to be 
discontinued upon returning to work. The applicant never missed work because of 
the accident, therefore, Red Cliffs should not be required to pay any type of 
temporary disability payments to the applicant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Red Cliff respectfully requests that the findings of 
fact of the Appeals Board be set aside and order that the administrative law judge 
findings as to the credibility determination be upheld. In the alternative, Red Cliffs 
request that the decision by the administrative law judge denying them of a hearing 
with regards to temporary disability be overturned. Finally, Red Cliffs should not be 
required to pay any temporary disability because the applicant was able to perform 
light duty work, and refused to perform light duty work at Red Cliffs. 
DATED this the 4 ^ day of May, 1999. 
PLAN^^ALLACE: CHJtISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
ROBERT C. OLSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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St. George, Utah 84770 
Allen Hennebold 
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Tab A 
THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
Case No. 97462 
GLENDA C. CHAMBERS, 
Petitioner, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
v. * AND ORDER 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC.; 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondents. * 
HEARING: February 26, 1998 at 2:00 P.M. 
BEFORE: Benjamin A. Sims, Law Judge 
APPEARING: Aaron Prisbrey, attorney-at-law, represented the petitioner. 
Theodore Kanell, attorney-at-law, represented the respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Glenda C. Chambers is the petitioner. At the time of the alleged injury on January 18, 
1997, she was 31 years old, and had three dependent children under the age of 18. She was working 
two jobs, one for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc.(CIiffs), and one for Washington County ARC (ARC) She 
was not sure what the initials ARC stood for. She is asking for medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total disability compensation (TTC), temporary partial disability 
compensation (TPC), travel expenses, and interest based upon her claimed injuries to her back, knee 
and neck. 
2. At the time of the injury, she claims she was earning $6.15 per hour and was working 
46.75 hours per week for Cliffs, and was working 18-20 hours at $6.25 per hour for ARC. She was 
working as a coach for Cliffs. She described her job as assisting severely mentally and physically 
disabled people at Cliffs. At ARC, she did similar duties, but on more of an out-patient basis 
3. On January 18, 1997, she says she was helping Grace at Cliffs. Grace is an older woman 
with no mobility. She cannot walk and was not known at that time to talk. The petitioner thought 
that Grace weighed about 200 pounds and was about 5 feet 6 inches tall. The petitioner says she 
attempted to get Grace up. She got Grace out of bed, and put her into a wheelchair. She says Grace 
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fell forward out of the wheelchair onto the petitioner. The petitioner says she attempted to get Grace 
back up, and Gface uttered the words, "You better." Petitioner did not know what the words "you 
better" meant She had been told that Grace could or would not talk This accident was unwitnessed 
4. The petitioner alleges the following: She felt a shock through her left leg. Her back was 
numb. She took Grace to the lunch room, and finished her duties She says she did not report the 
incident at that time because she was afraid to do so. However, she also claimed at the hearing that 
she told Val who was a duty nurse and Irene Wall another employee that she had been injured. Val 
denied that he had been told by the petitioner of her injury, and Irene Wall did not testify. The 
petitioner says she went to the Dixie Regional emergency room (emergency room) that night after 
she got off work because her back hurt The emergency room provider noted the following: 
A 30-year-old female who was lifting a patient at Red Cliffs where she 
works. She hurt her back. She has pain in her back that radiates up to 
the top and down her legs. It is like a "burning ache," she states. The 
patient is usually healthy. Has never hurt her back before. No regular 
medical problems. She is allergic to codeine and takes no regular 
medications. She does not complain of any true paresthesias but has 
just a burning type of feeling down her legs that she can feel in both 
heels. No particular areas of numbness. No weakness in her legs. She 
has no loss of bladder or bowel control. 
* * * 
Weight 240 lbs.... She has pain in the lumbosacral area but can feel it 
all the way up to her thoracic spine region and down into her buttocks 
When she sits up for me, she sits up easily. Legs have normal strength 
and tone Reflexes symmetric No Babinski. Sensation intact to touch, 
pressure and vibration. X-ray of back does not reveal any acute osseous 
abnormality. 
ASSESSMENT: Lifting injury with back strain and muscle spasm 
PLAN: The patient was referred for physical therapy on Monday. She 
will be placed on an anti-inflammatory, Relafen, and a muscle relaxant 
as well as cool compresses. If she is not feeling better, we will have to 
reexamine her. 
MR 96- (Emphasis in original) It is noted the history given to the providers at the emergency room 
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was based upon the petitioner's statements. 
5. The radiology report done on January 18, 1997 showed "mild to moderate degenerative 
disc narrowing and facet sclerosis at the lumbosacral junction. Facet disease is felt responsible for 
minimal ventral subluxation of L5 on SI. No pars defect or other acute bony process seen " MR 98. 
6. Another x-ray was taken of the lumbar spine on January 22,1997 due to continued pain. 
No abnormalities were observed. MR 101. She was released to return to modified duty on January 
20, 1997 by Dr. David Jensevar. She claims that she called Cliffs and told someone that she could 
return to work, but no one called her back. She then later contradicted this statement by claiming she 
did not know that she could return to work because the doctor never told her that she could. 
However, she continued to work at ARC where she performed roughly similar duties 
7. On January 31,1997, she saw Dr. Root for pain in her low back, mid back, neck, and legs 
including numbness in her knees and ankles. She reported she was injured at work when lifting, and 
had not had these problems in the past. MR 71. Dr. Root reported she had a past history of knee 
problems, and had seen Dr. Moore on January 30, 1997 for knee problems. Dr. Root felt she had 
lumbosacral as well as cervical and upper thoracic strain/sprain injury with superimposed degenerative 
disc/spine disease in the lumbar spine. Her work was limited to modified light duty for one week. 
MR 74. 
8. On February 7, 1997, Dr. Root reported there were no significant abnormalities in her 
spine x-rays, and that she did not come to physical therapy during the preceding week because she 
did not feel well. She was instructed by Dr. Root that if she did not comply with his instructions she 
would be considered to be noncompliant which would likely affect her workers' compensation 
benefits. She claimed she had no money to pay for therapy and that is why she did not go. However, 
the evidence shows she possessed a Medicaid card and Medicaid was paying her medical bills. Dr. 
Root kept her on light duty for another week. MR 76. 
9. Dr. Root saw her again on March 25, 1997. She reported to him she had hurt her back 
"this weekend lifting a patient." This could be considered to be an intervening accident. She testified 
this incident occurred at ARC Dr Root did not say whether she was retained on light duty. MR 78 
She did not see Dr. Root after this date. 
10. She was scheduled for rehabilitation sessions on February 21, 1997, March 4, 1997, and 
March 14, 1997 She did not appear for therapy on March 4, 1997. She did not come to therapy 
subsequent to March 25, 1997. Her physical therapy plan included treatment for three weeks 
beginning on February 27, 1997 for 2-3 sessions per week. MR 62. She explained her reason for not 
attending as lack of funds. As discussed earlier in these findings, she had a Medicaid card which 
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would have entitled her to certain medical services presumably rnciuding this treatment MR 64. Her 
statement that she could not get treatment due to lack of funds is suspect On April 9, 1997, the 
therapist Roger Harward reported that no further care was planned, and that the petitioner had been 
reinjured while working for ARC. MR 67 At the time that her therapy was terminated, she was 
"working about full time for ARC." Exhibit R-2. She stated at the hearing on a number of occasions 
that the doctors and therapists did not tell her things which these professionals report in their medical 
records they did tell her. 
11. She saw Dr. Gunn, DC on August 20, 25, 28, 1997. He performed ultrasound and 
manipulation on her on these dates for '"acutg traumatic lumbar and cervical sprains with paravertebral 
splinting, bilateral sciatic neuritis, and suboccipital frontal cephalalgia " MR 1 
12. There was testimony from Nancy Stewart and Kelly Cottam who both work at ARC. 
They remembered the petitioner complained of back pain. Nancy Stewart testified the petitioner hurt 
herself pushing a wheelchair for ARC, but Nancy Stewart also testified the petitioner said she had 
hurt herself elsewhere. Kelly Cottam testified the petitioner indicated she could not push the 
wheelchair at ARC because of her back problems. 
13. Val Penman is a registered nurse at Cliffs. He does not remember ever talking to the 
petitioner about a work injury even though the petitioner claims that she did He is sure that if she 
had notified him, he would have filed out an incident report since that is standard procedure 
14. The petitioner requested that the issue of permanent partial impairment be reserved. 
15. Prior to her injury at Cliffs, she claims no problems with her neck, head, and back. She 
did have problems with her knees previous to the January 18, 1997 alleged incident, but now claims 
that she cannot crawl, although she could previously 
16. She testified that she worked 39 hours at Cliffs during the 16 day period January 1-15, 
1997. On January 18, 1997, she went to lunch at 10:47 A.M. and stopped work at 2:57 PM. She 
never came back to any type of work at Cliffs after January 18, 1997. With regard to her work at 
ARC, she did not work at ARC on Saturday, January 18, 1997, but she worked the following hours 
for ARC on the dates indicated: 
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19 January 1997 6 hours 
20 9 
21 5 
22 7 hours 
23 0 
24 4 
25 8 
The hours show that she was working full time for ARC after her injury at Cliffs 
17 She was terminated on February 10, 1997 because she had not called or shown up for 
work over an extended period of time. 
18 The testimony of the petitioner is inconsistent and she contradicted herself on material 
and relevant bits of information essential to a resolution of this case Her testimony when compared 
to the testimony of others, and when viewed in connection with medical documents is also deficient 
The petitioner testified a patient fell on her in an unwitnessed accident on January 18, 1997 
However, the totality of the evidence is insufficient to show the circumstances which she alleges since 
her testimony is less than credible, and every bit of evidence in this case which can be mustered to 
show that she was injured must rely on her statement that she in fact was injured There is no 
independent evidence not relying on her statement to show that the incident did occur If she had 
been more credible in other instances in this case, the evidence might have been sufficient to a 
preponderance to confirm her claim 
19 Assuming that her claim of injury is sufficient to meet the legal causation requirement, j 
the evidence likewise fails to show she notified her employer she was returned to modified duty The 
evidence further shows she was able to continue working a full time job for ARC, and did so She I 
cannot pick and choose which employer to work for especially if she wants her employer to pay her 
workers' compensation benefits However, in this case, she obviously did. She continued to work 
for ARC. She claims she made a phone call to Cliffs to tell them she could return to work, but she 
then alleges her doctor never told her she could return to work She also cannot remember who she 
talked to at Cliffs These are just some of the inconsistencies which made her testimony doubtful 
20 Unfortunately, the preponderance of the evidence does not show the petitioner was 
injured in the manner alleged, and her claim must be dismissed 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The evidence is insufficient to a preponderance to show that the petitioner Glenda Chambers 
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was injured in a accident arising out of and in the course of employment for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. 
on January 18, 1997 as required by the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of Glenda Chambers for workers' compensation 
benefits based upon an injury to her back, knee and neck, alleged to have arisen out of and in the 
course of employment for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. on January 18, 1997 is dismissed with prejudice 
for failure to show legal causation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be received 
in the offices of the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the Division of Adjudication within 
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a 
Motion for Review is received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, any response by the opposing party shall be filed within 15 days of the date of receipt of the 
Motion for Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12. 
A Motion for Review will be decided by the Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of 
the parties requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board in accordance with 
U.C.A. Section 34A-1-303 within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, or in the case of a party 
responding to the Motion for Review, the request must be made within twenty (20) days of the date 
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
Dated this J. 7 day of May 1998. 
c
 -EtenjimiA^A Sims 
i^ aw Jurfge 
a3: chambers ord wpd K^^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I did mail by U.S. prepaid 
postage the Order in the case of Glenda Chambers v. Red Cliffs 
Regional, Inc., Case No. 97462 to the following on May 27, 1998: 
Glenda Chambers 
18057 Jonathan Street 
Adelanto CA 92301 
Theodore Kanell, Atty 
PO Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
Aaron J. Prisbrey, Atty 
135 North 900 East, Ste #4 
St. George UT 84770 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER OF REMAND 
* 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. and * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * Case No. 97-0462 
* 
Defendants. * 
Glenda Chambers asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of her claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Was Ms. Chambers involved in an accident while working for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. 
("Red Cliffs" hereafter) on January 18,1997? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On the date of Ms. Chambers' alleged accident, she was working as a nurse's assistant for 
two different employers, Red Cliffs and Washington County ARC ("ARC" hereafter). Ms. 
Chambers has testified that the accident occurred while she attempted to lift a patient into a wheel 
chair at Red Cliffs. The patient, who cannot speak and has no control over her muscles, fell forward 
from the wheel chair. As Ms. Chambers tried to catch the patient, she fell backward with the patient 
on top of her. Ms. Chambers felt pain in her back, but was able to return the patient to her wheel 
chair. 
Ms. Chambers completed her shift without reporting the foregoing incident to Red Cliffs 
management. She did not report the incident because she had nearly been fired for poor attendance 
a few days earlier and, consequently, was afraid to report the accident with her patient. She alleges 
that because her back pain grew worse over the next few hours, she sought treatment that evening 
at a hospital emergency room. She told the emergency room staff she had hurt her back at work in 
a lifting accident. Emergency room staff pro vided treatment and submitted the "Physician's First 
Report Of Work Injury or Occupational Disease" to the Labor Commission. 
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Ms. Chambers contends that she subsequently called Red Cliffs and reported her accident 
to someone she believed was Val Penman, R.N. Mr. Penman does not recall any conversation with 
Ms. Chambers. A few days later, on January 22, 1997, she formally reported her accident to Red 
Cliffs. That same day, Red Cliffs filed the "Employer's First Report of Injury" with the Labor 
Commission. 
As previously noted, Ms. Chambers was working at both Red Cliffs and ARC at the time of 
her accident. Her co-workers at ARC, Nancy Stewart and Kelly Cottam, recall that Ms. Chambers 
began suffering from back pain at about the time of the alleged accident and that she said she had 
injured her back while working at Red Cliffs. 
In addition to the medical treatment Ms. Chambers received at the emergency room on the 
evening of the accident, she sought treatment from other physicians and chiropractors. In each case, 
she advised them that she had injured her back in a lifting accident at work. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Ms. Chambers' right to workers' compensation benefits is based on her claim that she was 
injured in an accident on January 18, 1997 while working for Red Cliffs. If the accident did not 
occur, then Ms. Chambers' claim for benefits'must fail. The Appeals Board has, therefore, carefully 
considered the evidence on this critical threshold issue. 
Ms. Chambers has testified under oath that the accident in question did, in fact, occur. 
Obviously, Ms. Chambers has an interest in the outcome of this case, but her testimony cannot be 
entirely discounted on that basis alone. Her description of the incident is plausible and has remained 
consistent since the event occurred. The fact that the event was essentially unwitnessed is not 
unusual, since Ms. Chambers' work duties placed her in isolated situations. The record is clear that 
Ms. Chambers sought medical attention the same evening as the accident and attributed her injuries 
to the accident at Red Cliffs. She also told other medical providers and co-workers that she had been 
injured in an accident at Red Cliffs. The Appeals Board notes that all these statements are consistent 
and were made long before Ms. Chambers stopped working or claimed workers' compensation 
benefits. 
While the foregoing facts support Ms. Chambers' version of events, her failure to 
immediately report the accident to Red Cliffs' staff tends to undermine her credibility. Nevertheless, 
the Appeals Board concludes that the preponderance of evidence establishes that on January 18, 
1997, Ms. Chambers was involved in the accident while working at Red Cliffs. 
Because the Appeals Board finds that Ms. Chambers was injured in a work related accident, 
it is necessary to remand this case to the ALJ for further proceedings to resolve issues of legal and 
medical causation and the benefits due Ms. Chambers, if any. 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board grants Ms. Chambers' motion for review and remands this matter to the 
ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this fcl day oLAagt&t, 1998. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
L. Zane Gill \ 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
Case No. 97462 
GLENDA C. CHAMBERS, * 
Petitioner, * 
* 
v. * 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC.; * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
Respondents. * 
INTRODUCTION: 
This case was remanded by the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission on September 
1, 1998. The Appeals Board remanded the case to the Law Judge to "resolve issues of legal and 
medical causation." Since the Appeals Board found Glenda Chambers (Chambers) to be a credible 
witness, it now remains only to determine the extent of her work related injuries and the benefits to 
which she is entitled. 
She is asking for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) from January 19,1997 to 
August 28,1997 during the period she claims she was not able to work at the Red Cliffs Regional 
(Red Cliffs). The evidence shows she worked for ARC through August 24,1997 at which time she 
terminated her employment with ARC. At the time of her injury while working for Red Cliffs, the 
time sheets show for the seven days including the date of injury, she worked the following hours at 
Red Cliffs: 
12 January 1996 8.5 hours 
13 8.0 
14 6.25 
15 0 
16 7.0 
17 8.25 
18 8.75 
The time sheets submitted by Red Cliffs show she worked 46.75 hours for the seven day period 
immediately preceding her injury. It is appropriate to include the day of her injury since she worked 
a full day on this date. She was earning $6.15 per hour for a total of $308.27 while working for Red 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW 
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Cliffs. She was working initially for 16.50 hours during the January 12-18,1996 period noted above 
at ARC for $6.25 per week for a total of $ 103.13 per week. This gives her a weekly total of $411.40 
which equates to a workers' compensation TTC rate of $274 to which shall be added $15 for her 
three underage dependents for a weekly total of $289. 
After her injury at Red Cliffs, she increased her hours at ARC. This shows she was able to 
work, at least modified duty. Based on the fact she was working, she is not entitled to TTC, but is 
instead entitled to TPC. The evidence shows she missed no days of work at ARC. During the period 
of TPC (January 19,1996 through August 28,1996), she worked 961.5 hours and earned $6,009.38 
at ARC. The period of weeks covered is 31.714. This gives her average weekly earnings at ARC 
of $189.49. This entitles her to a TPC rate of $148 per week to which shall be added $15 for her 
dependents for a total of $163. 
Chambers has preexisting degenerative disc/spine disease in the lumbar spine. She has 
preexisting problems in both knees. On October 13,1995, the medical records note she was "very 
overweight," at approximately 240 pounds, and complaints of pain were associated with her knees. 
At the emergency room on January 18,1997, she reported she had pain in the lumbosacral areas, and 
could feel it all the way up to her thoracic spine region and down into her buttocks. X-rays were 
taken of her knees, but there was no objective evidence of any problem with them. She was 
determined by the emergency room physician to have a lifting injury with back strain and muscle 
spasm. The preponderance of the evidence shows her complaints centered around her lumbar region 
and cervical region. 
She incurred an injury to her back during the weekend while lifting a patient while working 
for ARC. MR 67 and 78. Dr. Root made the following statement on March 25,1997: 
Patient ... evidently strained herself this weekend lifting a patient. Her physical 
therapist will assess for further strain injury and will also consider a modified 
functional capacity evaluation.... 
On A.pril 9,1997, the physical therapist Roger Harward also reported she had reinjured her 
back while working for ARC, but noted she "refused further treatment." There is no indication she 
was terminated by the physical therapist. He noted no further care was planned. MR 67. Dr. Root 
also noted he she did not comply with his regimen of therapy. Although it could be found that she 
was not cooperative with treatment after April 9,1997, and she would not be entitled to TPC beyond 
that date, the Appeals Board's finding of credibility on the part of the petitioner dictates a contrary 
result since she testified she did cooperate, and the reason she did not get additional treatment was 
because she had no money. It is also noted that IHC is a nonprofit charitable institution to which 
patients who do not have the funds can voluntarily apply for payment relief. Chambers apparently 
had no qualms about seeking charitable relief since she possessed a medicaid card which entitled 
her to have the State pay for her medical care, in certain instances. There was also no notation on 
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any of the medical records that she was being cut off for any reason other than her lack of 
compliance or her indication she did not desire further medical treatment. 
The petitioner did not seek further treatment according to Dr. Root after March 25,1996 even 
though Dr. Root indicated that he desired her to see a physical therapist. (The physical therapist 
noted she was last treated on April 9,1997). She was working for ARC at that time, and not the 
respondents. The weekend period would have been on or about 22-23 March 1997. The March 22-
23, 1997 back reinjury while she was working at ARC would presumably cut off liability for her 
back injury on the part of Red Cliffs, since Chambers would be entitled to medical treatment from 
ARC workers' compensation benefits. However, the medical evidence is lacking as to the extent 
of her injury at ARC, and it is not clear how her injury of January 18,1996 was affected by the event 
at ARC. Therefore, liability will continue for Red Cliffs. 
No evidence has been presented as to a permanent partial impairment rating related to the 
Red Cliffs' incident of January 18,1997. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. TPC is available when the petitioner can work, because of her industrial injury, only a 
portion of the hours she was working at the time of her industrial injury. U.C.A. Section 35-1-65.1. 
2. Chambers suffered lumbosacral as well as cervical and upper thoracic stain/sprain 
including temporary knee problems as a result of a fall injury incurred on January 18,1997 which 
arose out of and in the course of her employment for Red Cliffs. U.C.A. Section 35-1-45. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Red Cliffs Regional and/or Business Insurance Company 
pay the medical and travel expenses of Glenda Chambers for her lumbar and cervical region, neck, 
and knees incurred on January 18,1997 through August 25,1997 according to the RVS of the Utah 
Labor Commission with interest of eight percent per annum to be paid to the medical providers from 
the date when the medical providers first billed for the medical treatment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Red Cliffs Regional and/or Business Insurance Company 
pay temporary partial disability compensation to Glenda Chamber s for the period January 19,1997 
through August 25,1997 at arateof$163perweek for 31.714 weeks for a total of $5,169.38. This 
amount is accrued and will be paid in a lump sum with eight percent interest per annum from the 
date when the periodic payment was first due. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Red Cliffs Regional and/or Business Insurance Company 
pay Aaron Prisbrey, attorney for Glenda Chambers, an attorney's fee of $1,033.88 plus 20 percent 
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of the interest which is paid to Ms. Chambers. The amount paid to Mr. Prisbrey shall be deducted 
from the amount to be paid to Ms. Chambers, and shall be sent directly to Mr. Prisbrey. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be received 
in the offices of the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the Division of Adjudication 
within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or 
appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days 
of the date hereof, any response by the opposing party shall be filed within 15 days of the date of 
receipt of the Motion for Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C. A. Section 
63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the Commissioner of the Labor Commission 
unless any of the parties requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board in 
accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-303 within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, or in the case 
of a party responding to the Motion for Review, the request must be made within twenty (20) days 
of the date the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
Dated this J l_ day of September 1998. , 
£ "•^JmjamimA. Sims 
( Law Jujjge 
a3 :chambers.ord.wpd 
4 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, ORDER ON REMAND 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I did mail by U.S. prepaid 
postage the Order in the case of Glenda Chambers v. Red Cliffs 
Regional, Inc., Case No. 97462 to the following on September ^1, (f~/J Sj
 t 
1998: 
Glenda Chambers 
18057 Jonathan Street 
Adelanto CA 92301 
Theodore Kanell, Atty 
PO Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
Aaron J. Prisbrey, Atty 
135 North 900 East, Ste #4 
St. George UT 84770 
Kathy libuskeeper 
5 
